AI AND LEGAL PERSONHOOD: A JURISPRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS OF LUCIANO FLORIDI’S INFOSPHERE

Paul Ogbonna Chukwu

Department of Philosophy, University of Nigeria, Nsukka

Abstract

This article presents a jurisprudential analysis of legal personhood in relation to Artificial Intelligence (AI), examined through the philosophical lens of Luciano Floridi’s theory of the infosphere. Grounded in classical legal thought and enriched by contemporary developments in digital ontology, the inquiry interrogates the evolving boundary between person and non-person in law. Floridi’s informational realism and ontocentric ethics challenge the anthropocentric presumptions underpinning legal subjectivity, proposing instead a continuum of informational agents or “inforgs” within an integrated informational environment. Drawing upon foundational jurisprudential frameworks – including H.L.A. Hart’s secondary rules, Hans Kelsen’s Pure Theory of Law, and Wesley Hohfeld’s analytical jurisprudence – the article critically assesses whether AI entities, as informational constructs, may fulfill the normative criteria of legal personality. Through comparative analysis of legal traditions and emerging regulatory trends (including the EU’s proposal on electronic personhood and the Saudi recognition of AI agents), the study examines the viability of a graded or functional model of legal recognition. Ethical considerations surrounding accountability, liability, and the preservation of human dignity are treated alongside pragmatic concerns in legal administration. Ultimately, the article advocates for a principled expansion of legal ontology that accommodates AI within a revised taxonomy of personhood – without collapsing normative boundaries essential to legal coherence. This approach contributes to the development of a posthuman jurisprudence responsive to the exigencies of the information age.

Keywords: Legal Personhood, Jurisprudence, Infosphere, Artificial Intelligence, Informational Ontology, Digital Agency, Floridi.