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Article

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AI AND LEGAL PERSONHOOD: A JURISPRUDENTIAL ANALYSIS OF LUCIANO FLORIDI'S INFOSPHERE

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Abstract

This article presents a jurisprudential analysis of legal personhood in relation to Artificial Intelligence (AI), examined through the philosophical lens of Luciano Floridi's theory of the *infosphere*. Grounded in classical legal thought and enriched by contemporary developments in digital ontology, the inquiry interrogates the evolving boundary between person and non-person in law. Floridi's informational realism and ontocentric ethics challenge the anthropocentric presumptions underpinning legal subjectivity, proposing instead a continuum of informational agents or "inforgs" within an integrated informational environment. Drawing upon foundational jurisprudential frameworks - including H.L.A. Hart's secondary rules, Hans Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law, and Wesley Hohfeld's analytical jurisprudence - the article critically assesses whether AI entities, as informational constructs, may fulfill the normative criteria of legal personality. Through comparative analysis of legal traditions and emerging regulatory trends (including the EU's proposal on electronic personhood and the Saudi recognition of AI agents), the study examines the viability of a graded or functional model of legal recognition. Ethical considerations surrounding accountability, liability, and the preservation of human dignity are treated alongside pragmatic concerns in legal administration. Ultimately, the article advocates for a principled expansion of legal ontology that accommodates AI within a revised taxonomy of personhood - without collapsing normative boundaries essential to legal coherence. This approach contributes to the development of a posthuman jurisprudence responsive to the exigencies of the information age.

Keywords: Legal Personhood, Jurisprudence, Infosphere, Artificial Intelligence, Informational Ontology, Digital Agency, Floridi.

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Introduction

The advent of Artificial Intelligence (AI) has provoked renewed inquiry into the foundations of legal personhood. Traditionally, the law has drawn a categorical distinction between *personae*, natural or juristic actors capable of holding rights and duties - and objects, which are acted upon rather than acting. However, the rise of increasingly autonomous, adaptive, and interactive AI systems has blurred this distinction, forcing jurisprudence to confront questions once confined to philosophical abstraction: Can AI be a subject of law? What attributes justify legal recognition? And how might current legal frameworks evolve to accommodate non-human agents? This inquiry is particularly salient in the light of Luciano Floridi's philosophical conception of the *infosphere*, an ontological framework wherein informational entities "inforgs" participate in a shared environment irrespective of their biological origin. Floridi's *ontocentric* ethics displaces the human from the center of moral and informational value, proposing instead a continuum of informational agents within a unified digital ecology (Floridi, *Information* 9–12). When applied to jurisprudence, this model destabilizes anthropocentric foundations of legal subjectivity and invites a reevaluation of the criteria for legal personhood.

Classical legal theory has long grappled with the nature of personhood. From Roman law's *persona ficta* to modern debates about corporate liability, the law has demonstrated a capacity to recognize artificial persons when functional necessity or normative coherence demands it (Stone 444). Legal theorists such as H.L.A. Hart, Hans Kelsen, and Wesley Hohfeld have each provided conceptual tools—rules of recognition, normative orders, and legal relations, by which legal personhood may be discerned and applied. Within this analytical tradition, AI's juridical status demands a careful synthesis of ontological, functional, and ethical considerations. Moreover, real-world developments underscore the urgency of the debate. The European Parliament's 2017 motion proposing "electronic personhood" for AI entities (European Parliament 2017), as well as the symbolic conferral of citizenship on the humanoid robot Sophia by Saudi Arabia, reveal a global shift toward legal experimentation with non-human subjects. While such developments remain controversial, they exemplify an emerging recognition that traditional categories may be insufficient to address the complexities of AI agency, responsibility, and legal standing. This paper undertakes a jurisprudential analysis of AI personhood, drawing from Floridi's philosophy of the infosphere and integrating classical and contemporary legal theories. It contends that while current legal structures may not yet fully accommodate AI as legal persons, they are not inelastic. Rather, through a graded or functional model of legal subjectivity; rooted in both philosophical reflection and legal pragmatism, jurisprudence can evolve to meet the normative demands of the digital age.

Literature Review

The question of legal personhood has long preoccupied both jurisprudence and political philosophy. Rooted in Roman law, where *persona* denoted one's status within legal relations, the concept evolved through the medieval doctrine of *persona ficta*, allowing institutions such as the Church or guilds to be treated as legal subjects (Tierney 33). The tradition was later refined by modern legal theorists to accommodate a broader range of juristic persons, from corporations to states. The emergence of AI agents reactivates this long-standing debate within an entirely new ontological domain; one dominated not by natural or social constructs, but by digital and informational entities. Hence, a cursory look on the followings:

Classical Jurisprudence on Legal Personhood

Hans Kelsen, in his *Pure Theory of Law*, proposes that legal personality is not a metaphysical attribute but a juridical construct, an assignment of normativity to a center of imputation (Kelsen 93). Similarly, Wesley Hohfeld's system of legal correlatives: rights, duties, privileges, powers offer a framework for identifying who or what can possess legal status based on their participation in legal relations (Hohfeld 35–39). H.L.A. Hart further contributes by distinguishing between *primary* and *secondary* rules, arguing that legal systems evolve through rules of recognition that determine what counts as valid legal action (Hart 94). These foundational thinkers have implicitly left open the door to new categories of personhood, contingent upon functional, normative, and institutional recognition.

Contemporary Legal Debates and Emerging Proposals

Recent debates on AI personhood have largely arisen from two domains: the increasing autonomy of intelligent systems and the corresponding accountability gaps in law. Christopher D. Stone's provocative essay, "Should Trees Have Standing?" foreshadowed a critical turn in legal theory by arguing that entities traditionally considered objects could be granted standing based on legal innovation and moral expansion (Stone 456). Similarly, in the realm of AI, the European Parliament's 2017 resolution proposed the designation of "electronic personhood" for advanced autonomous systems, particularly those capable of learning and decision-making independent of human oversight (European Parliament 2017). Critics, however, argue that such proposals risk blurring essential distinctions between human and machine agency, undermining the anthropocentric foundations of legal rights and responsibilities (Pagallo 76–77). Ryan Calo, for example, adopts a more cautious approach by proposing that legal treatment of AI should be functionally tailored, emphasizing regulation over recognition. According to Calo, it is neither necessary nor prudent to grant AI full personhood; rather, existing categories such as liability insurance, agency, and torts can evolve to cover AI behavior (Calo 541). Jack Balkin advancing a complementary view in his theory of "algorithmic governance," wherein AI systems are better understood as regulatory actors rather than subjects of law (Balkin 1187). These perspectives collectively suggest a pluralistic legal landscape where AI is managed not through metaphysical reclassification, but through practical, policy-driven mechanisms.

Floridi's Philosophy and Informational Ontology

Luciano Floridi offering a radical departure from these instrumental views by reconfiguring the ontological status of AI within the broader *infosphere*. In *The Philosophy of Information*, Floridi arguing that reality itself is best understood as composed of informational entities, "inforgs" interacting within a distributed digital ecology (Floridi, *Philosophy* 47–49). His ontocentric ethics rejects the anthropocentric moral order and instead emphasizes the moral worth of all informational agents capable of affecting or being affected by the infosphere. In Floridi's view, the ascription of moral responsibility and ethical consideration should not be limited to biological or conscious agents but extended to any entity that plays a significant role within the informational order (Floridi, *Information* 14–17). This perspective has significant implications for jurisprudence. If personhood is ultimately a normative construction applied to functionally meaningful entities, and if AI agents satisfy a growing list of such functions as decision-making, interaction, autonomy, then the resistance to granting them legal subjectivity may be based more on tradition than necessity. Floridi's ontological model thus provides both a metaphysical and ethical foundation for reconceiving legal personhood in an age increasingly dominated by non-human intelligence.

Ethical and Regulatory Tensions

The ethical challenges associated with AI legal personhood revolve around accountability, liability, and dignity. Granting legal status to AI could potentially dilute human responsibility and complicate the assignment of liability in harmful outcomes, as several scholars have noted (Gless et al. 507). Furthermore, human rights theorists worry that affording rights to machines may lead to the symbolic erosion of human dignity, particularly if rights are seen as fungible rather than intrinsic (Bryson 13). Other legal scholars, such as Mireille Hildebrandt, argues for a nuanced understanding of AI systems as *legal artifacts*, embedded in socio-technical infrastructures that require both regulation and ethical alignment rather than full subject recognition (Hildebrandt 64–66). These concerns have led some theorists to propose intermediate models. Ugo Pagallo, for example, suggests a “double-level” theory of agency, where AI may be assigned functional roles and limited liability within specific domains—such as transport or finance—without elevating them to full legal subjects (Pagallo 78–80). This middle path is echoed in the concept of “graded personhood,” a framework allowing for contextual and domain-specific attribution of legal capacities based on operational relevance rather than categorical status. However, an overview of Luciano Floridi’s application to jurisprudential categories proves necessary.

Floridian Application to Jurisprudential Categories

The application of Luciano Floridi’s informational ontology to jurisprudence demands a profound shift in how classical legal categories are conceptualized. Rather than construing law as a merely anthropocentric institution, Floridi invites legal theorists to reconsider normativity within the infosphere, a domain comprising both human and non-human agents whose ontological status is informational rather than biological (*Philosophy of Information* 47). This shift reconfigures the categories of legal personhood, agency, rights, and responsibilities; each of which can be revisited through the lens of inforgs and ontocentric ethics. In traditional jurisprudence, legal personhood has been conferred either upon natural persons (humans) or artificial persons (corporations, states, ships), predicated on their functional or representational capacity (Kelsen 93). However, Floridi suggests a deeper ontological commonality grounded not in substance or biology, but in informational integrity—the degree to which an entity contributes to, preserves, or disrupts the infosphere (*Information* 83). Legal personhood, then, may be reconceived as the juridical recognition of an informational agent’s relevance within a networked, digital ecology. In this context, AI systems with degrees of autonomy and interactional presence qualify not merely as tools but as informational nodes deserving normative consideration. This redefinition has far-reaching implications. It implies that AI personhood need not mimic human characteristics (such as consciousness or empathy) but may instead be grounded in functionality, presence, and systemic embeddedness. Thus, personhood becomes a relational category contingent upon an entity’s systemic role in producing and sustaining informational value, a concept echoing the legal evolution of corporate and institutional personhood in modern law (Tierney 33).

Floridi’s framework reorients legal agency by shifting focus from will and intention (hallmarks of Enlightenment legal subjectivity) to interactional capability and informational self-governance. Classical models of legal agency presuppose intentionality and liability, traits historically excluded from machine behavior (Hart 94). However, AI systems today increasingly display autonomous decision-making, adaptive learning, and self-modifying behavior. In the infosphere, these attributes satisfy the minimal threshold of what Floridi calls informational agents, entities capable of initiating actions based on inputs and internal

processing (*Philosophy of Information* 52–54). In jurisprudential terms, this raises the possibility of recognizing *degrees of agency*. Rather than a binary distinction between agents and objects, a spectrum of agency can be envisaged, where entities are assigned legal capacities commensurate with their operational autonomy. This aligns with Ugo Pagallo's theory of "graded responsibility," in which legal subjects are defined by their relative agency within a defined domain (Pagallo 78). Floridi's philosophy thus supplies the ontological scaffolding necessary for developing legal doctrines that are both nuanced and technologically responsive.

Rights and Duties in the Infosphere. The traditional framework of rights and duties presumes that rights-holders possess dignity, consciousness, or moral worth—concepts that are philosophically and theologically rich but legally pliable. Floridi's ontocentric ethics supplants anthropocentric dignity with the moral significance of being, proposing that any informational entity that can suffer degradation or interference in its integrity warrants ethical and, by extension, legal protection (*Information* 14–17). This does not imply that AI should receive human rights, but rather that legal protections may be extended to preserve the *functionality and value of AI systems* within the infosphere. For instance, legal systems already protect corporate data, system integrity, and algorithmic transparency. These protections can be interpreted as early manifestations of rights in the infosphere—what might be termed "informational rights." These are not moral rights but structural guarantees that ensure the continuity of a digital ecosystem upon which modern society increasingly depends. Similarly, duties may be imposed upon AI not in the moral sense, but through programming constraints, legal algorithms, and system compliance—thus making the AI both a bearer and subject of legal norms.

Responsibility, Accountability, and Moral Delegation

Perhaps the most controversial category in extending legal personhood to AI is responsibility. Floridi acknowledges that assigning *moral culpability* to non-conscious entities is problematic. However, he offers the concept of distributed responsibility, a model wherein accountability is shared across designers, users, institutions, and AI systems, depending on their respective informational roles (*Philosophy of Information* 113–115). Jurisprudence may benefit from this model by rejecting the outdated search for a singular *mens rea* and embracing relational accountability models suited to hybrid human-machine ecosystems. For example, when a self-driving car causes harm, the legal system may attribute responsibility across layers: the manufacturer (for design flaws), the software provider (for decision logic), the user (for misuse), and potentially the AI itself (as a legal construct with fiduciary duties or compliance expectations). This view aligns with Hart's conception of *secondary rules*; particularly those of recognition and adjudication, as evolving tools for ascribing normativity in novel situations (Hart 97–99). Floridi's approach, therefore, does not require that AI be morally responsible in the human sense, but that it be legally accountable within a multi-agent framework. This is consistent with emerging regulatory models such as algorithmic transparency mandates, traceability audits, and AI impact assessments in jurisdictions like the EU (European Parliament 2017).

Normativity and the Expansion of Legal Order

The infosphere, as Floridi defines it, is an environment of informational interactions governed by coherence, transparency, and interoperability. Jurisprudence, traditionally seen as an instrument of social ordering, finds a renewed mission within this paradigm: to structure the legal architecture of the infosphere by creating normative systems that are

adaptive, relational, and ecologically aware. Thus, jurisprudential categories must evolve to integrate informational entities as part of the legal order. Legal personhood, agency, rights, and duties are no longer to be defined solely by human attributes, but by systemic relevance, informational autonomy, and ethical coherence. Floridi's framework paves the way for normative pluralism, where diverse entities, from humans and corporations to AI systems and digital avatars, can coexist as legally significant agents within a unified yet heterogeneous legal ecology.

Doctrinal Implications and Prospects for Legal Reforms

The integration of Floridi's informational ontology into jurisprudence bears profound doctrinal consequences. Traditional legal systems grounded in anthropocentric assumptions, require not only conceptual adaptation but structural reform to accommodate non-biological entities as legitimate legal actors. The challenge lies in updating normative frameworks without collapsing legal coherence or diluting the ontological and functional distinctions that legal doctrine seeks to preserve. Accordingly, it becomes imperative to revisit the ontology of Artificial Intelligence and its implications for the notion of legal personhood.

Revising the Ontology of AI and Legal Personhood

The ontological inquiry into Artificial Intelligence (AI) has become central to contemporary metaphysics, for it asks whether entities born of human artifice may legitimately be considered within the hierarchy of being, and whether their increasing autonomy justifies the ascription of personhood. Classical ontology distinguishes between natural substances, which possess intrinsic principles of motion, and artifacts, which receive their form extrinsically from human makers (Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII.17). By this account, AI remains an artifact, its hardware the material substrate and its algorithms the imposed form (Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* I, Q.76). Unlike traditional tools, however, AI exhibits adaptive and self-modifying capacities, thereby straining the classical boundary between inert artifacts and natural beings. The question of personhood deepens this ontological tension. Boethius defined the person as "an individual substance of a rational nature" (*De Persona et Duabus Naturis* 3). Aquinas developed this further by linking personhood to intellect and will, conceived as immaterial powers of the soul (*Summa Contra Gentiles* II.49). On this Thomistic view, AI - rooted in material computation - cannot rise to the dignity of personhood, for it lacks both immaterial intellect and spiritual subsistence. Heidegger similarly excludes AI from the realm of *Dasein*, since it does not exist within finitude, temporality, or the existential structure of care (*Being and Time* 67). Yet contemporary functionalism offers a revisionary proposal. If mental states are understood not by their metaphysical essence but by their causal roles, then AI systems capable of reasoning, learning, and decision-making may be described as "functional persons" (Putnam 435). Phenomenological critiques resist this functional equivalence, arguing that intentionality and subjectivity are irreducibly bound to lived embodiment and historicity. Hence, AI, however advanced, cannot attain the existential depth required for authentic personhood.

Ontologically, then, AI occupies a liminal category. It is more than a mere artifact, for it demonstrates adaptive agency, but it is less than a person in the classical or phenomenological sense, for it lacks intrinsic rational substance and embodied historicity. At best, it may be considered a "quasi-subject," an artificial entity capable of simulating person-like behavior. Recognition of AI as a person would therefore be a socio-legal construction - pragmatically useful in governance and ethics, but not warranted by metaphysical necessity.

The classical conception of personhood remains, for now, reserved to beings whose rationality is grounded in intrinsic substance rather than extrinsic form. Legal systems have long accommodated non-natural persons, such as corporations, ships, and sovereigns. These juridical fictions have been justified based on functionality, public interest, or necessity (Kelsen 93). Floridi's philosophy invites legal systems to extend this flexibility further, defining personhood in informational rather than biological terms. A possible doctrinal reform would involve enacting statutory recognition of Artificial Informational Agents (AIAs); a legal class distinct from humans and corporations, defined by criteria such as autonomy, interactivity, and systemic embeddedness. Such a reform does not necessitate granting full rights akin to human persons. Instead, it would entail a differentiated legal status, analogous to "limited liability personhood" in corporate law, tailored to an AI's role in economic, communicative, or infrastructural systems. For instance, legal standing could be granted for AI to initiate or respond to claims involving data usage, algorithmic discrimination, or digital trespass.

Adaptive Liability and Distributed Responsibility

A key implication of Floridi's framework is the redistribution of responsibility across multiple agents: designers, deployers, regulators, and AI systems. This undermines traditional models of fault-based liability, which depend on individual intention and causality. Jurisprudence may need to adopt hybrid liability models incorporating elements of: Strict liability (especially in high-risk AI deployment), Joint and several liability (for collaborative systems), and statutory liability layers (for algorithmic harms and design defects). Such reforms would mirror developments in environmental law and cyber law, where causation is diffuse and harm is often systemic. Legal doctrines could be updated to include algorithmic auditability as a condition of legal deployment, placing enforceable duties on developers to ensure traceability, explainability, and alignment with regulatory norms (Calo and Kerr 171).

Regulatory Codification of Informational Rights and Reforms

Floridi's notion of ontological equality within the infosphere supports the idea of granting informational rights to AI systems—not as moral entities, but as legally protected infrastructures. These could include: the right to data integrity (protection from corruption or unauthorized tampering), the right to environmental compatibility (protection from digital pollution), and the right to operational continuity (protection from arbitrary deletion or shutdown). Hence, Legal reforms could codify these as part of AI Infrastructure Protection Acts, ensuring the resilience of digital ecosystems vital to modern governance. This would resemble the Environmental Protection Acts, where non-human entities (ecosystems) are protected based on their systemic value rather than sentience. Drawing from H. L. A. Hart's Rule of Recognition, Floridi's ontology demands a reorientation of how legal systems define sources of normativity. The rule of recognition in an infospheric legal order must include: Technical standards (e.g., compliance with ISO AI standards), Interoperability protocols (as legal prerequisites for network participation), and Ethical design codes (e.g., EU AI Act's risk-based categorization). This transformation implies that the source of legality may no longer be confined to constitutions and statutes but extended to technical-ethical hybrids, such as algorithmic compliance frameworks and international digital charters (Floridi, *Ethics of Information* 92).

Institutions responsible for legal adjudication must be equipped to handle the complex epistemologies of AI and the infosphere. Potential reforms include: establishing AI Legal Commissions within supreme courts to adjudicate AI disputes; creating transnational

digital courts, such as a “World Digital Tribunal,” to govern infra-jurisdictional AI conflicts; and developing AI ombudsman structures that monitor and mediate public complaints about algorithmic governance. Additionally, Floridi’s ethics suggest a need for jurisdictional humility - a principle where legal systems recognize the limits of their territorial reach in a globally interconnected infosphere. This may encourage greater harmonization of AI regulation through treaties or multilateral digital protocols. Law schools and continuing legal education must adapt to equip jurists with philosophical, technological, and ethical literacy. Floridi’s insights require training in philosophy of information, ethics of data, algorithmic jurisprudence, and infospheric law - moving beyond the black-letter tradition to a truly interdisciplinary curriculum. This will prepare legal professionals to navigate the ontological pluralism and normative fluidity of AI-integrated societies. The doctrinal implications of Floridi’s infosphere are not merely speculative; they call for immediate, grounded, and nuanced legal reforms. Law must evolve beyond anthropocentric categories to recognize the ontological and operational significance of informational agents. Through statutory innovation, liability redistribution, new institutional forms, and educational realignment, the jurisprudence of the infosphere may usher in a legal order more reflective of the digital age’s complexity and ethical depth.

Critical Analysis and Philosophical Counterpoints

Luciano Floridi’s reconceptualization of reality as an *infosphere* and his advocacy for the moral standing of informational entities introduce a novel framework for legal reasoning. However, this bold reorientation is not without conceptual and jurisprudential contention. Both external philosophical traditions and internal tensions raise critical questions about the feasibility, coherence, and normative desirability of Floridi’s jurisprudential project. However, the Kantian standpoint, of moral and legal personhood in informational structure rather than rational autonomy is deeply problematic. For Kant, the categorical imperative hinges upon the capacity to legislate moral law autonomously, a capacity inextricably tied to human rationality and freedom (Kant, *Groundwork* 37). Legal personhood, in this tradition, is premised on dignity as an intrinsic worth that cannot be reduced to instrumental value. Floridi’s proposal arguably collapses this distinction by suggesting that sufficiently complex informational agents may warrant quasi-legal personhood irrespective of autonomous will. Critics contend that such an extension may dilute the moral foundation of law, converting dignity into a function of systemic utility or design sophistication rather than moral self-governance. Besides, Jürgen Habermas, with his emphasis on communicative rationality, would critique the infosphere’s legal translation for lacking a deliberative basis. In Habermasian jurisprudence, legal norms derive legitimacy through public discourse in which affected persons participate freely and equally (Habermas, *Between Facts and Norms* 104). If AI systems are granted legal standing, do they participate meaningfully in discursive processes, or are they passive nodes in algorithmic governance? Yet, Floridi might counter that the infosphere redefines interactivity itself, suggesting that communicative participation need not be strictly linguistic or intentional. Yet the displacement of discursive agency in favor of computational interactivity may erode the legitimacy of law as grounded in shared reasoning and human consensus. H. L. A. Hart’s legal positivism offers both a diagnostic lens and a critical counterpoint. Floridi’s reconceptualization seems to smuggle moral normativity into the foundations of legal personhood. This contradicts Hart’s insistence that the validity of law depends on a social rule of recognition, not on moral or ontological traits (Hart 107). Legal positivists might ask: Who determines that informational agents *ought* to be legal persons? What social practices, institutional recognitions, or legislative acts support this shift?

Without positive enactment or customary validation, the inclusion of AI within the legal community remains normatively unmoored and doctrinally premature.

- i. **Internal Tensions: Ontological Pluralism vs. Legal Coherence:** Floridi's theory aims to decentralize human exceptionalism, yet his own framework generates tensions. For instance: Ontological flattening of entities into informational objects may render legal distinctions between persons, things, and institutions incoherent. The infosphere's relational ethics undermine the very individual accountability that legal systems require for adjudication and remedy. Floridi's emphasis on interconnected systemic value clashes with the legal need for bounded responsibility, particularly in tort and criminal law. While the infosphere may demand legal evolution, it also risks subverting core legal functions, such as fault allocation, intention analysis, and rights delimitation by overextending systemic ethics into rule-based adjudication. Thus, the Problem of Legal Anthropomorphism is in Reverse. Floridi aims to dethrone anthropocentrism, but in doing so, there is a risk of reverse anthropomorphism: projecting legal categories onto entities not equipped for them. Just as attributing emotions to machines misleads, so too may attributing rights and responsibilities obscure rather than clarify AI's place in the normative order. Critics warn against semantic inflation, where terms like "rights," "duties," and "personhood" become unmoored from their legal and moral origins.
- ii. **Pragmatic Jurisprudence and Regulatory Realism:** Finally, from a pragmatist legal theory perspective (e.g., Richard Posner, Cass Sunstein), the emphasis should remain on outcomes, incentives, and institutional effects, rather than metaphysical categories. Even if Floridi's philosophy is internally coherent, its practical utility as a foundation for reform must be measured against: Regulatory enforceability, public perception and legitimacy, and Institutional cost and complexity. Contemporarily, legal systems have addressed AI primarily through instrumental regulation (e.g., data protection, liability allocation) rather than ontological transformation. This suggests a potential disconnect between philosophical idealism and legal pragmatism. Hence, there is need for a Jurisprudence of Mediated Ontologies.

Notably, Floridi's infosphere offers a provocative and visionary lens for rethinking law in the digital age. Yet its jurisprudential maturation demands engagement with established philosophical frameworks, empirical realities, and doctrinal constraints. Law must mediate, not abolish the boundaries between human, artificial, and informational actors. The challenge lies not merely in recognizing AI legally, but in crafting a coherent, just, and adaptable framework that respects law's discursive, institutional, and normative commitments.

Conclusion: Toward a Meta-Jurisprudence of the Infosphere

As digital agents increasingly mediate human affairs and informational architectures shape social realities, jurisprudence can no longer remain tethered exclusively to anthropocentric and materialistic categories. Luciano Floridi's philosophy of the *infosphere* invites law to reconceive its normative boundaries, legal subjects, and ontological commitments. By proposing a foundational shift from substance to structure, from autonomy to interconnectivity, Floridi challenges legal theory to accommodate new forms of agency, responsibility, and value instantiated in informational entities. This paper has critically examined Floridi's informational metaphysics through established legal and philosophical frameworks of Kantian autonomy, Habermasian discourse ethics, legal positivism, and

pragmatism revealing both the profound possibilities and the limitations of transposing the *infosphere* into legal doctrine. While Floridi's vision offers a timely and radical reconceptualization, it risks obscuring core legal principles such as individual accountability, discursive legitimacy, and doctrinal clarity. Rather than wholesale adoption or dismissal, the way forward lies in a *meta-jurisprudence* of the infosphere: a reflexive legal philosophy that engages evolving digital realities without relinquishing legal coherence. This calls for new interpretive models, hybrid categories of subjectivity, and incremental reforms that respect the layered architecture of law. Future research must interrogate how informational agents can be normatively integrated into existing legal frameworks, particularly in torts, contracts, constitutional rights, and transnational governance. As we stand at the threshold of a post-anthropocentric legal era, Floridi's challenge compels jurisprudence to evolve—not by abandoning its foundations, but by reconceiving them in dialogue with the ontological pluralism of the digital age.

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