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USING MAX SCHELER TO ELUCIDATE THE PLACE OF THE POST-HUMAN IN THE FACE OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE

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Abstract

The discovery and presence of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in our times has certainly redefined the way so many things are done today. And not only redefining the way things are done, AI's presence has gone further to even redefine or challenge how posthumans perceive themselves or their role in the world. With the projected development of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) and its projected successor Artificial Superintelligence (ASI), there are AI scientists and engineers who think that these systems would eventually not only achieve human-level intelligence but would even outperform posthumans in all areas of intelligent behaviour. Consequent upon this, these systems would even make human engagement in most things redundant and may even ultimately pose existential problems to posthumans. In the face of this scenario, this paper, using the expository and evaluative method, seeks to interrogate this claim. Max Scheler's philosophical anthropological insight provides the guiding light for this interrogation. The result of this interrogation is that in spite of whatever quantitative and even qualitative intelligence manifestations seen in these systems, they can never come to rival the ontological status of posthumans and cannot therefore replace them in the order of things.

Keywords: Artificial Intelligence, Human Intelligence, Posthuman.

Introduction

Since the term **Posthuman** could be ambiguous, it is necessary before delving into the subject matter proper, to clarify in which sense it is being used here. Three possible shades of meaning could be associated with it. "Posthuman" could mean, among other things, simply and literarily "after-man" in the same way postmortem means "after death" or postexilic means "after the exile." An interpretation of posthuman in this sense would, of

course, be nonsensical in the language of logical positivists. It is nonsensical because it would not be referring to anything. A posthuman society, in this sense, simply cannot exist because, as Agnes Heller (1999:2) rightly observed, man is a historical being and only man creates history. A society "after-man" would therefore be inconceivable. Posthuman could also mean, in the thinking of transhumanism, "technologically enhanced man." Akin to humanism, transhumanism, in the words of Richard S. Lewis, (2021):

> seeks to reduce suffering, inequality, and premature death – or more positively: to increase access to health, happiness, and longevity of all human beings and their environment – through the strategic use (including nonuse) of technology.

The use of technology being contemplated here is what has been called in biotechnology brain emulation, also referred to as mind uploading. "This is the concept," continues Richard S. Lewis, "that the brain could possibly be digitalized." The idea, he goes on to say, is that:

> this process could possibly capture the 'mind' and consciousness of a person, making them no longer reliant on a biological body. This potentiality would allow their consciousness to live almost indefinitely, or at least greatly enhance their lifespan, and would qualify- at least in the minds of many – as a Posthuman.

Simply put then, the Posthuman is for transhumanists an evolutionary development that will occur in the distant future when technology would have made this possible. Posthuman in any of the above two senses simply cannot be appropriate in our context. To understand "Posthuman" in a way that enables us discuss appropriately the above topic, we must turn now to the new field of philosophical discipline called **Philosophical Posthumanism.** This discipline is, in the main, a philosophical critique of the prevalent idea of man handed down to us by the Renaissance and Enlightenment era of the 17th and 18th centuries Western Europe. This prevalent idea of man or humanism, according to Beatrice Han-Pile:

> is often associated with an optimistic and secular view of the world which asserts the privilege of human beings over non-organic (or organic but nonhuman) entities, defending the rights of human beings to happiness and to the development of their individual potential (cited in Richard S. Lewis).

In view of the very obvious negative associations accompanying this view of rational humanism, as it is also called, **Philosophical Posthumanism** has worked out a new concept of posthuman which, among other things, "discusses the human as removed from the center of all things and the exceptionalism that has surrounded the idea since the Enlightenment." In this new view, the focus is on inter-relatedness of existence, the notion that there is no stand-alone individual. In Philosophical Posthumanism therefore:

> the human being is conceptualized here not as an independent and autonomous entity with clear cut boundaries but a heterogeneous subject whose self-definition is continuously shifting, and that exists in a complex network of human and non-human agents and the technologies that mediate between them (cited in Richard S. Lewis).

In thinking of the posthuman in the context of philosophical Posthumanism, we are thinking of ourselves, as Lewis puts it, "as we are now (and have ever been)" but now in the midst of other beings whose presence in our human space forces us to new self-definitions or self-awareness. Among the complex network of human and nonhuman agents with which the

Posthuman must now contend are the AIs that have, in the recent times, invaded our hitherto exclusive human space.

The Philosophical Background to the Emergence of Artificial Intelligence

This philosophical background is provided us by Francis Bacon (1561-1626), one of the founding fathers of modern philosophy. One of his greatest contributions to both Science and Philosophy is his book, **The New Organon,** which he so named in obvious reference to Aristotle's logic, which is named **The Organon.** As the title depicts, Bacon here proposes a new logic or way of arriving at knowledge. The hallmark of this new logical method, Bacon says, is **induction.** And the ultimate aim of the inductive process, according to him, is the discovery of the *forms* of things (and from these forms to gain power into the workings of nature). By the form of things, Bacon does not of course mean form in the Aristotelian sense. By forms, he means the laws that constitute the nature of things. The form of heat, for example, is the law that governs heat. To discover the form of heat therefore is to discover the law of heat, that is the element that is essential to heat which, if present, there will be heat and if absent, there will be no heat. Such forms are abstracted inductively from experience and are not mere abstractions, generated by imagination like platonic or scholastic forms. **Philosophy of nature,** for him, studies these forms/laws in themselves and their general import for various embodiments of the nature in question.

Presently, I am not aware whether it was the application of Bacon's principle that led to the production of heaters. One area where the application of this principle seems to me obvious is in reproductive medicine. Scientists in this field, having successfully studied the law of fertilization, have gone on to enable fertilization outside the normal natural locus of fertilization which is the human or animal body. It is this breakthrough that gave humanity her first test tube baby, Louise Brown, on 25th July 1978 in Oldham, Northwest England. Genetic scientists have today gone further than their first-generation forebears. While the first test tube babies had to be planted back into their mothers' wombs for normal gestation and growth, modern geneticists have gone further to study what Bacon would call the laws of the womb that allow it to nurture the fertilized egg to human fruition. Again, having successfully done that, they have proceeded now no longer to re-implant the fertilized egg back to the mother's womb but to an artificial incubator equipped with all the womb-like enabling conditions for the growth of the foetus. With this development, the woman no longer needs to carry her baby in her womb for nine months.

The Emergence of Artificial Intelligence

As a technical term, "Artificial Intelligence" was coined and introduced into scientific vocabulary by the acclaimed father of the discipline that now goes by the name **Artificial Intelligence,** John McCarthy, an American computer scientist and inventor. In 1956 John McCarthy organized a summer conference at Dartmouth University, USA to which he invited a group of scientists from several professions who had hitherto begun to discuss the potential of developing an artificial brain. Notable among the invited scientists were Alan Turing, Marvin Minsky, Allen Newell, and Herbert A. Simon. The topic for discussion in this conference as reflected in its caption was **Artificial Intelligence!** It was at this conference that McCarthy introduced and defined Artificial Intelligence as "the science and engineering of making intelligent machines, especially intelligent computer programs" or "a branch of computer science by which we create intelligent machines which can think like humans, act like humans, and able to make decisions like humans" (cited in Jakanovic (2022)). On their part, Allen Newell and Herbert Simon (2019:6) describe Artificial Intelligence as "the part of

computer science devoted to getting computers (or other devices) to perform tasks requiring intelligence." For Margaret Boden (1990:1), Artificial Intelligence "is sometimes defined as the study of how to build and/or program computers to enable them to do the sort of things that minds can do." According to John Haugeland (1997:1), Artificial Intelligence is "the attempt to construct intelligent artifacts, systems with minds of their own."

What comes out clearly from these various definitions is that Artificial Intelligence or the science of Artificial Intelligence is a secondary or derivative science founded on the science of computer or computer science. The challenge that faced these scientists now was to discover, in line with Francis Bacon's prescription, the form of intelligent manifestation/processes in man and then to replicate this outside the natural locus of intelligent processes which is the human mind to a machine/computer i.e. a non-human entity. There were indeed efforts in this direction even before the 1956 conference convoked by John McCarthy. In the article *Artificial Intelligence – Alan Turing and The Beginning of AI* the author, B.J. Copeland noted that the earliest substantial work in the field of artificial intelligence was done in the mid-20th century by the British logician and computer pioneer Alan Mathison Turing. Therein he writes:

> In 1935 Turing described an abstract computing machine consisting of limitless memory and a scanner that moves back and forth through the memory, symbol by symbol, reading what it finds and writing further symbols… This is Turing's stored program concept, and implicit in it is the possibility of the machine operating on, and so modifying or improving, its own program.

Having now studied, as if were, the *form* or *law* of intelligent manifestations or processes, these scientists had then to develop the type of supercomputers that would have the capabilities to do what the AI scientists expected them to do, namely mimic those actions and behaviours these AI scientists see as actions and behaviours that display intelligence as possessed by human beings. It is this replication of such intelligent processes outside their natural locus which is the human brain/mind, that qualifies this intelligence as artificial like artificial limbs or artificial hairs etc. (For a detailed analysis of the opposition of "natural" and "artificial" in respect of intelligence, see Justin Onyeukaziri (2022). Following the euphoria that greeted the initial success of the program and the future prospect it held, many companies like Google, Apple, Honda, General Motors, NASA and even governments invested heavily in the emerging AI industries. No doubt from the early 2000s till date, tremendous developments have taken place in the area of artificial intelligence and its accompanying technologies. Tracing these developments here goes beyond the task of this paper. (See here Amanda Peterson).

Such intelligent software is ubiquitous in our world today. When today we unlock our smart phones with a voice mail or our finger prints, we do not realize perhaps that it is AI at work here. When we open our smart phone and ask it for the current exchange rate of the dollar or whether it will rain in the next one hour and we get from it the required information, I guess we do not know that it is AI at work. When we type our letters or projects with our modern laptops and make spelling mistakes, and our laptops not only point these spelling or grammatical errors, but go on to correct them, we do not realize perhaps that it is AI at work here. When you are at any standard international airport, and instead of a custom officer looking at your face to cross-check if you are really the one whose image is on your passport, you simply slot your passport through a given portal and look straight into

a mirror in front of you and the gate opens for you, you do not realize perhaps how AI is at work also in this place. I can go on and on to enumerate the various instances of the ubiquitous presence of AI in our everyday lives today. (On this note, see Amanda Peterson, and Afe Babalola).

The Place of the Posthuman in the Face Of AI

The question of the place of man, whether the rational man of the Renaissance cum Enlightenment era or the posthuman of Philosophical Posthumanism, has always been contentious. It was this contentiousness that led Max Scheler in the first place to write the book, *Man's Place in Nature,* years before the advent of AIs. It is my considered opinion that the arguments adduced therein to cement the singular position of man in the universe are still valid in our changed circumstances. The old proponents of the equality of man with other animals had hinged their argument on the assumed presence of intelligence found in these animals. Engineers in the AI industry want us to believe that the AI systems they are producing are intelligent beings. They predicate intelligence to them because these AI systems exhibit semblances of the intelligence these engineers see in humans. It would seem then that the possession of intelligence by man, animals, and this time around, AI systems is the ground for the thought of placing the three together, man, animals, AIs and then querying the place of man not only in the face of animal intelligence but more pungently in the face of AI systems. I say more pungently because these AI systems seem to have even outperformed animals in the area of demonstrating human-like intelligent behaviours. The question we must ask ourselves now is: are these so-called intelligent behaviours of AI systems such as to make us cast doubt on the place of the posthuman in the face of these AI systems? Let us first of all determine to what extent we can even talk of intelligent behaviours with reference to AI systems. From there, we can then attempt to answer the question of whether the AI systems can make us doubt the place of the posthuman in the face of these AI systems.

Human Intelligence and Machine Intelligence

Let us take the typical case of the intelligent machine or AI system that is said to have beaten the world champion, Garry Kasparov, in a chess match. This AI system achieved this feat simply because it was trained, as AI experts would say, in countless number of times within the micro-world of chess playing. It thus masters, as if it were, all the possible moves the human agent could make. It is explainable therefore that it could beat Garry Kasparov or indeed any human agent for that matter. But is this feat indicative of human intelligence? Consider that outside its micro-world of chess playing, this AI system is, of course, incapable of performing any other feat whatsoever. This is certainly unlike the human agent who, even if he loses the chess match can play many other games like ludo, whot, scramble, tennis, and engage in a multitude of other intelligent behaviours. Furthermore, we could ask, in the act of playing chess, were the two agents, the AI agent and the human agent, really performing the same act, namely: processing information and taking decisions? On the surface level, it would seem so. On a deeper level, both are certainly not performing the same act. While the human agent, Garry Kasparov, is thinking out, *sui generis*, the moves he has to make, the AI agent is fore-programmed to make the moves it makes. Take also the case of the chatbot that answers any questions put to it or the generative AI that spins out a perfect love-letter when asked of such. Are these AI systems thereby really exhibiting human-like intelligence as some AI enthusiasts would want us to believe? Let us hear what some AI experts have to say on this matter. Bernard Marr (May 8, 2024) writes:

> Think of Generative AI as a highly-skilled parrot. It's capable of mimicking complex patterns, producing diverse content, and occasionally surprising us with outputs that seem creatively brilliant. However, like a parrot, Generative AI does not truly "understand" the content it creates. It operates by digesting large database and predicting what comes next… For example, when Generative AI writes a poem about love, it doesn't draw from any deep, emotional reservoirs; instead, it relies on a vast database of words and phrases typically associated with love in human writing. This makes it excellent for tasks like crafting articles on global economics or generating marketing copy, it can convincingly mimic human-like prose based on the information it's trained on. However, it lacks the ability to grasp complex human experiences or perform tasks it hasn't been specifically programmed to handle, such as managing your taxes or strategizing economic policies.

When AI scientists qualify AI systems as "generative," I guess they thereby mean to point to the ability of such machines to generate information in the manner the human brain does this. But is this suggestion that the generative AI and the human brain/mind are performing similar operations justifiable? If anything, what these socalled generative AIs are doing is a very poor semblance of what happens in the brain when it comes to the brain generating information. Think of what the human mind does with the closed-up twenty-six (26) letters of the English alphabet with which it generates countless number of words, ideas or information. And when AI systems are fed with or trained on the products of such original generative processes, and in turn simulate such generative prowess, AI apologists want us to equate what such AI systems are doing with the spontaneous generative power of the mind. The words of William H. Calvin (2004:74) come to mind in this connection: "But you don't want to confuse a mechanism that amplifies the effects of the real thing with, well, the thing itself."

Yann LeCun, Meta's chief scientist and winner of the prestigious Turing Award, and often referred to as one of the "three godfathers of AI" is even more blunt in his condemnation of the so-called intelligence of these AI systems. His critique includes even the much talked about Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) purported to mimic human intelligence more comprehensively. For him there isn't even anything like AGI because, he says, "human intelligence is nowhere general" (See Thomas Macaulay (2024)). In the above article, LeCun pointed to a quartet of cognitive challenges facing all AI systems, namely *reasoning, planning, persistent memory, and understanding the world.* "These are four essential characteristics of human intelligence - also animal intelligence, for that matter, that current AI systems can't do" he said. Without these capabilities, he further notes, AI applications remain limited and error prone. These intellectual shortcomings, he goes on to say, are particularly prominent in large language models (LLMs):

> We are easily fooled into thinking they are intelligent because of their fluency with language, but really, their understanding of reality is very superficial. They are useful, there is no question about that. But on the part towards human-level intelligence, an LLM is basically an off-ramp, a distraction, a dead end.

He then goes on to criticize the enormous amount of data used in the so-called training of these LLMs. According to him, it would take a human around 100,000 years to read all the text ingested by a leading LLM. That, he notes, is not the primary way human beings learn.

He goes on to note that we consume far more information through our interactions with the world. He then estimates that a typical four-yearold has seen 50 times more data than the world's biggest LLM. In conclusion, he then notes, "most human knowledge is actually not language so those systems can never reach human-level intelligence." Anthony Chemero, a Professor of Philosophy and Psychology in the University of Cincinnati College of Arts and Science agrees completely with Yann LeCun that LLMs differ from human cognition because they (LLMs) are not embodied like living beings who are always surrounded by other humans and material and cultural environments. Unlike humans, he says, AI doesn't have embodied experiences or emotions, making its intelligence fundamentally different from human intelligence (See Angela Koenig (2023). In the face of these grave limitations, reflective computer scientists and AI experts are beginning to question themselves whether one can really talk of intelligence in reference to computers and AI systems. At the end of his already cited article, B.J. Copeland (2024:12) notes:

> AI has no real definition of intelligence to offer, not even in the subhuman case. Rats are intelligent, but what exactly must an artificial intelligence achieve before researchers can claim this level of success. In the absence of a reasonably precise criterion for what an artificial system counts as intelligent, there is no objective way of telling whether an AI research program has succeeded or failed.

Prof. Stuart Russell of the University of California at Berkeley, described as a world leader in the field of Artificial Intelligence, is not guessing what AI scientists' definition of intelligence is. He believes that the current approach to building "intelligent" machines is profoundly dangerous. This is because he regards AI scientists' prevailing concept of intelligence – the extent that actions can be expected to achieve given objectives – as fatally flawed. The inappropriateness of this notion of intelligence he highlights in these words:

> AI researchers build machines, give them certain specific objectives and judge them to be more or less intelligent by their success in achieving these objectives. This is probably ok in the laboratory (cited in John Naughton (2021)).

In spite of these obvious proofs to the contrary, there remains still a group of AI scientists who think that they can, through more and more technological improvements, eventually achieve the ultimate professional goal of AI research which is ASI, that genius that never sleeps, as Bernard Marr describes it, and that would eventually even outperform human intelligence. Notable amongst such AI scientists is Ray Kurzweil, an American computer scientist and techno-optimist said to be a long serving authority on artificial intelligence. Rich Stanton (2024) credits Ray Kurzweil as saying: "we are going to expand intelligence a million-fold by 2045 and it is going to deepen our awareness and consciousness." For Ray Kurzweil and his like minds, we must therefore continue our investigation by now inviting Max Scheler to the discussion.

Max Scheler on the Place of the Posthuman in the Face of Artifical Intelligence
In the introduction to his philosophical anthropological work, **Man's Place in Nature,** Max Scheler dismissed the traditional theological, philosophical and scientific views of man of his time. Scheler sees the traditional theological view of man, exemplified in the Judeo-Christian view of man as **Imago Dei,** while the Greek view of man as **homo sapiens** exemplifies for him the traditional philosophical view. The scientific view for him is exemplified by Charles

Darwin's evolutionary theory of man. These three traditional views, Scheler (1962:6) observes, are held "in complete separation from each other." The imperative Scheler therefore saw himself confronted with was to offer in his work "a unified idea of man." The pathway to this was a recourse to a metaphysical dimension of man not envisaged in the above three traditions. In his view, man is not explainable only within the phenomenon called psychophysical life. According to Suncrates James W. Kidd, for Scheler, man is "a locus and a focus where life and spirit intercept." Max Scheler first published his philosophical anthropological work, *Man's place in Nature* in 1928, decades of years before the advent of AI. It is therefore understandable that the issue of AI was not known to him and as such could not have been a possible topic of discussion. What makes Max Scheler relevant in the discussion surrounding AI is, of course, the purported claim of intelligence ascribed to these AI agents by their creators, and the subsequent challenge thus posed by these AI agents to the posthuman. In their quest to replicate or even outperform the intelligent behaviours of the human being by multiplying intelligence a million-fold in the AI systems they create, these AI scientists lay a disproportional emphasis on intelligence as if intelligence on its own is the defining element of man. The more intelligent the AI system is, as it were, the more human-like it would be. This is where Max Scheler comes in. In the confusion created by rival claims of animal intelligence as held by some scientists of his time, Max Scheler sets forth his search for that which really distinguishes man from animals. Out of his metaphysical standpoint, he queries:

> If the animal has intelligence, does this mean there is only a difference in degree between man and animal - or is there still an essential difference? Is there still in man, … something that is not yet defined by, or included in, the capacity for choice and intelligence? (Max Scheler, 1962:35).

Assuming now that what we see manifested by AI systems is intelligence, we could well reframe the above question in our present context thus:

> If the AI system has intelligence, does this mean there is only a difference in degree between man and AI - or is there still an essential difference? Is there still in man, … something that is not yet defined by, or included in, the capacity for choice and intelligence?

In answering the above question, Max Scheler (1962:35f) notes:

> … I assert that the nature of man, or that which may be called his unique place in nature, goes far beyond the capacity for choice and intelligence and would not be reached even if we were to enlarge these powers, in a quantitative sense, to infinity.

That unique characteristic or principle, to use Scheler's terminology, which underpins the humanness, the being, of man Scheler calls "spirit. Describing this principle, he writes:

> The Greeks affirmed the existence of such a principle and called it reason, we will use a more inclusive term and call it "spirit" - a term which includes the concept of reason, but which, in addition to conceptual thought, also includes the intuition of essences and a class of voluntary and emotional acts such as kindness, love, remorse, reverence, wonder, bliss, despair, and free decision(1962:36).

Any psycho-physical entity that possesses this spirit, Scheler calls **Person** while any psycho-physical entity, like plants and animals, that do not possess it, in spite of their possessing

other psycho-physical attributes with man, attributes like choice and intelligence, he calls **Psychic Centres.** Intelligent machines being artifacts are, of course, no psychophysical (natural) entities. In this case they do not even quality to be called psychic centres. Of interest to us now is what this spirit does, according to Scheler, in the agent in which it is present. The fundamental difference between a person (i.e. possessor of spirit) and a mere psychic centre or indeed any entity that does not possess spirit, Scheler holds, is the power of objectification possessed exclusively by persons because of the presence of spirit in them. By objectification, Scheler means the ability or power to turn anything and even his environment into objects. It is this power that ultimately enables a person (man) to objectify even his psychic powers, including his intelligence:

> By virtue of the spirit, man is capable of expanding the environment into the dimension of a world and of objectifying resistance. He is also capable - and this is most remarkable - of objectifying his own physiological and psychological states, every psychic experience and every vital function. It is for this reason that this being can also throw his life away freely (Max Scheler 1962:40).

It is, of course, the power of this objectification that makes it possible for man or the Posthuman to objectify his intelligence (brain) and transfer this to man-made machines thus creating AIs in the first place. With reference to animals which, like human beings, are psycho-physical organisms, Max Scheler (1962:41) holds that though "the psyche of the animal functions and works, the animal is not a potential psychologist or physiologist." The animal is, of course, not a potential psychologist or physiologist simply because it cannot objectify its psychic state or physiological make-up. One can go on and on to enumerate what the animal cannot become because of this lack of the ability to objectify anything whatsoever. The animal cannot, for example, objectify its biological make-up to become a biologist, neither can it objectify its environment to become an environmentalist nor its food to become a nutritionist, etc. What is said here of animals applies even with greater force to non-organic entities like AI systems. Being the man-made tools they are, they can and do indeed help man in these various and varying fields of human endeavors but they cannot replace man by becoming any of these things man is or can become. At the end of his article *Generative AI hype is ending – and now the technology might actually become useful,* the author, Vitomir Kovanovic (2024) makes what I consider a very insightful observation:

> In the end, the AI revolution will look like an evolution. Its use will gradually grow overtime and little by little, alter and transform human activities, which is much better than replacing them.

It is because of their losing sight of the metaphysical or spiritual dimension of man that these AI scientists and engineers are focusing exclusively on intelligence and its possible expansion thereby missing the point, especially in their quest to rival or challenge the place of man. AIs may challenge the posthuman in his socio-economic space (and they would not be the first non-human agents to do so). On the ontological level, AIs, no matter how potentially intelligent they are purported to be, haven't even any *locus standi,* as lawyers would say, from which to challenge the posthuman. The reason, in Scheler's view, is simple: the posthuman's place in the cosmos is not determined only by the quantum of intelligence possessed but by the unique possession of spirit. The strenuous efforts being made by AI scientists to bridge the gap, as it were, between man and AI systems, especially the superintelligent machines, is, to my mind, an effort in futility. No one, of course, denies the

enormous benefits accruing to man from AI technologies. The problem, as Justin Onyeukaziri (2022:110) succinctly puts it "lies in the theoretical ends of the research and development of artificial intelligence, especially when the end is a claim that intends to negate or eliminate the ontological difference between the natural and the artificial or to scientifically reduce the artificial to the natural or the reduction of the natural to the artificial." This attempt, he notes, is neither plausible nor possible.

Conclusion

In the words of Bernard Marr (Oct. 31 2024:10:31) AI scientists want us to believe that the AI invention is "potentially the most significant technological leap in human history… that could become humanity's greatest achievement or its last invention". But is this really true? Sober minds will certainly not agree with that. Let me leave AI apologists with this quotation from Galileo Galilei (1632) cited in William H. Calvin (2004:137):

> But surpassing all stupendous inventions, what sublimity of mind was his who dreamed of finding means to communicate his deepest thoughts to any other person, though distant by mighty intervals of place and time! Of talking with those who are not yet born for a thousand or ten thousand years; and with what facility, by the different arrangements of twenty characters upon a page.

Even when AI is considered, rightly or wrongly, humanity's greatest achievement, would this warrant tilting admiration to the invention rather than the inventor? In the hype surrounding AI, this seems to me the case. The novelty of the discovery of AI is only a testimony to one of the insights of Francis Bacon that the human mind is adapted to study nature and make it subservient to man's interest. AI and indeed whatever scientific or technological breakthroughs that humans have put in place or would put in place in the future are all pointers to the not-yet-totally exploited possibilities of the human mind. Any wonder or admiration about AI and all it can do should therefore be directed not to the AI tools themselves but to the human mind, the human intellect that conceived and created them.

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