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### Article

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## DIGITAL RADICALIZATION: HOW SOCIAL MEDIA ALGORITHMS AMPLIFY TERRORIST RECRUITMENT IN NORTHERN NIGERIA

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### Abstract

This paper critically examines the role of social media algorithms in amplifying terrorist recruitment efforts in Northern Nigeria. It argues that while platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, and X (formerly Twitter) are designed to optimize user engagement, their algorithmic logic often favors sensational and polarizing content including extremist propaganda. Terrorist groups such as Boko Haram and ISWAP have increasingly exploited this digital ecosystem to radicalize and recruit disaffected youth by leveraging local grievances, distorted religious narratives, and emotionally charged media. The paper highlights how the underlying socioeconomic conditions in Northern Nigeria - marked by poverty, youth unemployment, and low education - make the region especially vulnerable to digital radicalization. It also critiques the double standards in how tech platforms respond swiftly to extremism in Western contexts but lag in addressing similar threats in Africa due to inadequate content moderation infrastructure and lack of regional engagement. As a way forward, the paper calls for multi-stakeholder interventions including digital literacy integration in education, improved collaboration between Nigerian authorities and tech companies, and targeted investment in counter-narratives and economic empowerment programs. In an age where algorithms shape ideologies, combating terrorism in Nigeria requires not only military strategies but also digital vigilance, corporate accountability, and inclusive governance.

**Keywords:** Digital Radicalization, Social Media Algorithms, Boko Haram, Online Extremism, Terrorist Recruitment, Content Moderation, Algorithmic Amplification, Digital Literacy.

### Introduction

The digital age has profoundly transformed the global landscape of communication, information sharing, and, perhaps most alarmingly, terrorist recruitment. Traditional forms of radicalization once rooted in secluded training camps, clandestine meetings, ideological

sermons in remote mosques, and the circulation of underground publications have largely given way to the boundless and largely unregulated environment of social media platforms. Extremist groups have quickly recognized and exploited the unprecedented reach, speed, and anonymity offered by digital technologies. These platforms are now central tools not only for disseminating extremist propaganda but also for real-time recruitment, coordination of attacks, and the global spread of radical ideologies (Conway, 2017; Awan, 2017).

As Weimann (2016) notes, terrorist organizations have skillfully adapted to the decentralized and anonymous nature of the internet, turning it into a powerful means of advancing their ideological goals while circumventing traditional security barriers. Digital jihadists utilize sophisticated media content ranging from emotionally charged videos and religiously framed narratives to memes and encrypted messaging apps to attract, indoctrinate, and mobilize recruits. According to Berger and Morgan (2015), groups such as ISIS developed highly coordinated online media wings capable of tailoring content to specific demographics and psychological profiles, a strategy now echoed by groups such as Boko Haram and ISWAP in Northern Nigeria. Moreover, the interactivity and algorithmic design of social media further compound the threat. Unlike one-way communication in traditional propaganda, platforms like Facebook, Twitter, YouTube, and Telegram allow users to engage directly with extremist content, receive immediate feedback, and gradually become immersed in radical echo chambers (Gill et al., 2017). These digital spaces do not merely transmit messages - they foster communities of belief and provide emotional reinforcement and a sense of belonging, especially to marginalized individuals. As highlighted by Ingram (2016), this narrative-driven recruitment approach appeals particularly to individuals seeking purpose, identity, or revenge, often in socioeconomically fragile contexts.

In the African context, particularly in Northern Nigeria, the situation is even more precarious. Poor digital literacy, high unemployment, and minimal government control of cyberspace offer fertile ground for extremist messaging to flourish unchallenged (Olojo, 2021). The growing affordability of smartphones and data bundles has made it easier than ever for terrorist groups to reach and radicalize disillusioned youth and turn the internet into a silent but deadly recruitment camp that operates 24/7. As Maher (2016) warns, the digital environment is not just a new frontier for terrorist activities - it is rapidly becoming the primary one. In Nigeria, particularly in the northern region, this digital shift has compounded an already complex security crisis. Boko Haram and its offshoot, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), have not only sustained their insurgency through violence but have evolved into tech-savvy entities deploying digital strategies for recruitment and indoctrination (Olojo, 2021). Their online presence has grown steadily, with carefully produced propaganda videos, encrypted communication channels, and targeted messaging that appeals to marginalized youth, especially in states plagued by poverty, illiteracy, and unemployment (Nwankpa, 2021). This has made the internet a frontline in the war on terror, one where the enemy is not just holding guns in the forest but also smartphones in their bedrooms. At the heart of this digital evolution lies the role of social media algorithms. These algorithms, engineered by platforms such as Facebook, YouTube, and TikTok, are designed to maximize user engagement by recommending content that aligns with users' interests and behaviors. While this model benefits entertainment and advertising, it becomes deeply problematic when applied to extremist content. As Tufekci (2018) argues, recommendation systems can unintentionally radicalize users by pushing them toward more extreme content, creating echo chambers where radical ideologies thrive. In the case of Northern Nigeria, these algorithms are not just promoting content they are helping to automate and amplify the recruitment pipelines of terrorist organizations.

### **Social Media Algorithms are not Neutral**

The common assumption that digital platforms are neutral conduits of information has been increasingly challenged in recent years. In reality, social media algorithms are not impartial systems. They are designed with a primary objective: to maximize user engagement and screen time. This objective leads platforms like Facebook, YouTube, Twitter (now X), and TikTok to prioritize content that provokes strong emotional reactions - often controversial, polarizing, or extreme - over content that is accurate, balanced, or constructive (Tufekci, 2015). These algorithmic priorities have far-reaching implications, especially in contexts of violent extremism. Social media platforms operate on engagement-based models where user actions - clicks, likes, shares, comments, and watch time - feed into algorithms that decide what content users see next. Content that generates more interaction is rewarded with wider visibility, regardless of its ideological or factual value. Consequently, sensational or radical content tends to outperform moderate or factual content in terms of algorithmic reach. According to O'Callaghan et al. (2015), extremist materials often exploit emotional triggers such as fear, anger, or identity affirmation, making them inherently more "viral" in algorithmic ecosystems. YouTube's recommendation engine, for example, has been criticized for pushing users toward increasingly extreme content in a phenomenon that Tufekci (2018) terms "the great radicalizer." In her analysis, she found that users who began with relatively innocuous searches (e.g., "Islam") were soon recommended videos that glorified jihad or denounced Western values. This incremental exposure, driven by watch history and algorithmic prediction, deepens a user's immersion in radical ideologies. Similarly, Ribeiro et al. (2020) found that YouTube's algorithm was significantly responsible for directing users from mainstream political videos to far-right or extremist channels, confirming a pattern of algorithmic radicalization.

This issue is compounded by the "echo chamber" and "filter bubble" effects. An echo chamber arises when users are consistently exposed only to viewpoints that reinforce their own beliefs, while a filter bubble occurs when algorithms personalize content so narrowly that users remain unaware of alternative perspectives (Pariser, 2011). These phenomena reduce ideological diversity and increase polarization, making individuals more susceptible to extremist narratives. In radicalization pathways, these algorithmic patterns can isolate users from counter-narratives and reinforce a skewed worldview, often built on victimhood, persecution, or religious absolutism (Sunstein, 2017). In fragile societies like those in Northern Nigeria - where access to balanced education, critical media literacy, and civic engagement is limited - these algorithmic dynamics are even more dangerous. Terrorist groups like Boko Haram and ISWAP have learned to manipulate hashtags, metadata, and emotional content to increase their algorithmic reach. According to Awan (2017), Boko Haram's digital strategy includes uploading emotionally compelling videos that mimic legitimate religious discourse, thereby avoiding immediate detection while maximizing visibility to susceptible audiences. The illusion of algorithmic neutrality masks a structural vulnerability one where corporate business models prioritize attention and profit over public safety and ideological balance. As Gillespie (2018) argues, algorithms are not just technical instruments; they are cultural and political forces that shape discourse and behavior. In the context of violent extremism, their amplification of radical content contributes directly to recruitment, radicalization, and ultimately, terrorism.

### **Northern Nigeria: A Fertile Ground for Digital Radicalization**

**The Socioeconomic Vulnerabilities of Northern Youth (Poverty, Unemployment, Low Education):** Northern Nigeria presents a particularly fragile environment for youth development, making the region vulnerable to radicalization—especially through digital means.

The area is marked by widespread poverty, high youth unemployment, and low educational attainment, which collectively contribute to a sense of hopelessness and frustration among the youth. According to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS, 2020), the North East and North West zones of Nigeria consistently record the highest poverty and illiteracy rates in the country. These structural deficits not only undermine social cohesion but also reduce the capacity of young people to critically engage with digital content or resist ideological manipulation. Research by Okolie et al. (2021) found that youth unemployment in Northern Nigeria is a key driver of radicalization, particularly when combined with weak state institutions and limited access to higher education. Many young people, especially in rural and peri-urban areas, lack critical thinking skills and digital literacy, making them susceptible to manipulation via online platforms. In such conditions, extremist recruiters find fertile ground, presenting their ideology as a path to purpose, status, and belonging - appeals that resonate in the face of chronic economic exclusion.

### **How Terrorists Exploit Local Grievances and Religious Sentiments Online**

Terrorist groups in Northern Nigeria, most notably Boko Haram and its splinter faction, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), have become increasingly adept at manipulating local grievances and religious sentiments to radicalize, recruit, and mobilize followers. These groups operate in a region marked by entrenched poverty, systemic inequality, political exclusion, and a long history of underdevelopment—conditions which generate deep-seated resentment among the population. Common grievances exploited by these groups include perceived marginalization by the southern-dominated federal government, widespread government corruption, heavy-handed military responses that often result in civilian casualties, and a growing disillusionment with Western-style education, which Boko Haram explicitly opposes in both ideology and name “*Western education is forbidden*” (Adamu, 2020; Botha & Abdile, 2019). Through social media, these terrorist organizations have been able to craft potent and emotionally resonant narratives that present their violent campaigns as divine mandates and their adversaries particularly the Nigerian state and Western allies as enemies of Islam and persecutors of the faithful. Olojo (2021) notes that Boko Haram’s propaganda frequently incorporates local dialects, Quranic verses, and references to historic injustices in order to amplify feelings of victimhood and moral urgency. By portraying themselves as defenders of the faith and avengers of historical and contemporary wrongs, these groups establish a moral justification for violence that is compelling to disaffected youth searching for meaning or purpose.

According to Onuoha and Hassan (2019), Boko Haram’s digital rhetoric is laced with distorted interpretations of Qur’anic texts and Hadiths, selectively quoted and removed from their theological context to legitimize bloodshed and demonize those who oppose them - including fellow Muslims. These messages are not produced arbitrarily; they are strategically calibrated to resonate with specific cultural, religious, and political conditions in Northern Nigeria. The content is intentionally simplified, emotional, and repetitive key features that align with the cognitive vulnerabilities of audiences who are poorly educated or digitally illiterate (Looney, 2020). Religion holds a central place in the social fabric of Northern Nigeria, and terrorists have weaponized this fact to their advantage. They present their agenda as a sacred duty, thereby silencing dissent and attracting sympathizers who might otherwise oppose violence. This religious framing allows them to bypass political critique and instead elevate their campaign as part of a cosmic battle between righteousness and evil. Digital platforms intensify the effect of these narratives. Platforms such as Facebook, WhatsApp, YouTube, and Telegram function as echo chambers where extremist ideologies are reinforced through social interaction, repetition, and community validation. Likes, shares, emojis, and forwarded

messages act as subtle forms of endorsement, giving the illusion of widespread support and legitimacy (Conway et al., 2019; Awan, 2017). What is particularly troubling is that these platforms allow content to circulate rapidly and persistently, even after being flagged or taken down. Terrorist recruiters often mirror and re-upload their videos or shift to encrypted messaging platforms, thus staying a step ahead of content moderation efforts. In many cases, they also use memes, nasheeds (Islamic chants), and emotionally charged testimonies to convey their messages in less detectable ways bypassing automated filters while still impacting vulnerable minds (Bloom et al., 2017). These strategies underscore the calculated and evolving nature of digital jihadist propaganda and the need for equally sophisticated countermeasures.

### **Digital Media Teams Used by Terror Groups to Create Emotionally Appealing Content**

Modern terrorist organizations no longer operate in physical isolation - they also maintain well-organized digital media cells tasked with producing high-quality, emotionally charged propaganda. Boko Haram, following the example of ISIS, has developed sophisticated media operations capable of producing slick videos, audio recordings, and written materials designed for maximum psychological impact. These materials often feature testimonies of former fighters, battlefield victories, or martyrdom narratives that glorify violence and instill fear (Awan, 2017). These digital products are not just random; they are crafted with specific communication objectives in mind. As Ingram (2016) notes, extremist propaganda typically follows a "push-pull" model: it pushes recruits away from the status quo (depicting the government as corrupt or illegitimate) and pulls them toward a new identity (as defenders of faith or avengers of injustice). Social media algorithms further amplify this content when users engage with it, allowing a single message to reach thousands or even millions within hours. Moreover, these media teams exploit current events - such as military operations, communal clashes, or political controversies - to reinforce their narratives and provoke emotional responses. Their use of local languages such as Hausa and Kanuri makes their messaging accessible to the intended audience, bypassing language and literacy barriers. This local linguistic adaptation, combined with visual storytelling, helps embed radical ideology within familiar cultural symbols and contexts and enhance its emotional and psychological appeal (Animasawun & Fatile, 2020).

### **Platform Responsibility and Global Double Standards**

The global digital ecosystem is dominated by powerful technology corporations Meta (Facebook, Instagram), Google (YouTube), and X (formerly Twitter) that wield immense influence over what billions of users see, share, and believe. While these platforms have developed robust moderation frameworks to tackle violent extremism in North America and Europe, their response to similar threats in Africa, particularly in regions like Northern Nigeria, remains disproportionately slow, inconsistent, and under-resourced. This disparity raises important questions about the global responsibilities of tech giants and the structural inequalities embedded in digital governance. A critical concern is the unequal speed and rigor with which tech platforms respond to extremist content. In Western contexts, particularly after events such as the Christchurch mosque attack in New Zealand or the Capitol Hill riot in the U.S., social media companies implemented swift measures to deplatform extremist actors, enhance content moderation tools, and issue transparency reports (Frenkel & Alba, 2019). In contrast, when Boko Haram, ISWAP, or other extremist groups release violent propaganda or recruitment videos targeting Nigerian or West African audiences, the response is often delayed or absent altogether. As Akinola (2021) points out, violent content targeting African audiences frequently remains online longer, suggesting either a lack of region-specific moderation strategies or a lack prioritization of African security concerns by platform headquarters.



A key factor behind this digital inequality is the lack of region-specific moderation tools and personnel. Most content moderation algorithms are trained using data derived from Western contexts - English, French, and other dominant global languages - while neglecting local African languages such as Hausa, Kanuri, or Fulfulde, which are widely used by terrorist groups in Northern Nigeria (Olojo, 2021). Moreover, the shortage of human moderators with cultural and linguistic competence means extremist messages can evade detection simply by using local idioms or coded speech. Amnesty International (2022) noted that platforms like Meta have fewer dedicated safety and moderation teams for sub-Saharan Africa compared to other regions, which undermines efforts to curb online incitement to violence, hate speech, or radical propaganda. This lack of localized digital governance has severe implications. In fragile regions like Northern Nigeria - where formal education and media literacy levels are low unmoderated extremist content is consumed more credibly, and its psychological impact is greater. Even more alarming is the fact that terrorist groups are aware of these platform blind spots and deliberately exploit them to bypass moderation systems. For example, Boko Haram has repeatedly adapted its messaging style to evade takedown algorithms, using visually suggestive rather than overtly violent material, embedding texts in images, or posting brief videos that disappear quickly strategies that benefit from the platforms' moderation weaknesses (Bloom et al., 2017).

In light of these challenges, corporate accountability must be re-emphasized. Social media companies must not operate as neutral observers while their platforms are used to incite violence or recruit for terrorist causes. Just as these platforms are quick to act in Europe or North America when threats emerge, they must extend the same urgency and seriousness to African regions under threat. Transparency in algorithmic decision-making, investment in Africa-specific moderation tools, and public disclosure of takedown data for extremist content in Africa are essential steps toward digital equity (Gorwa, 2019). Tech firms also have a duty to collaborate more actively with local governments, civil society organizations, and digital literacy advocates to strengthen resilience against online radicalization. The current digital governance model, which leaves Africa at the periphery of content moderation and policy enforcement, reflects a digital double standard that not only undermines trust but endangers lives. As argued by Taye (2020), if platform governance continues to be Eurocentric in practice, it will perpetuate structural violence by allowing harmful content to thrive in regions already struggling with conflict, inequality, and weak institutions. The solution lies not in treating African security threats as afterthoughts but in embedding Africa firmly within the global digital safety framework.

### **Call to Action: What Nigeria Must Do**

To confront the escalating threat of digital radicalization in Northern Nigeria, the Nigerian government, civil society, and international partners must take coordinated, proactive steps. Tackling the problem requires not only technological interventions but also social, educational, and economic reforms that build resilience against extremist messaging. Below are key areas of urgent action:

- i. **Introduce Digital Literacy into School Curricula and Community Outreach:** Digital literacy is the foundation for building resilience to online radicalization. Many Nigerian youths, especially in the North, interact with the internet daily through mobile phones but lack the skills to critically evaluate online content or detect disinformation and extremist propaganda. Integrating digital literacy and online safety education into the formal school curriculum will help students understand the risks of online manipulation, foster critical thinking, and empower them to make informed digital choices (UNESCO, 2021). Beyond schools, community-based outreach programs should also be prioritized to reach out-of-

- school youth and rural populations. These programs can involve local influencers, religious leaders, and youth organizations to teach safe online behavior, promote digital ethics, and debunk extremist narratives. As argued by Afolayan and Ejiogu (2020), empowering local communities through media education enhances grassroots resilience and deters the influence of terrorist recruiters.
- ii. **Collaborate with Tech Companies to Flag and Remove Extremist Content:** Nigeria must actively engage with global tech companies such as Meta (Facebook), Google (YouTube), and X (formerly Twitter) to develop region-specific protocols for detecting and removing extremist content. These collaborations should involve sharing local intelligence about trends in radical propaganda, linguistic nuances (e.g., Hausa or Kanuri dialects), and culturally embedded symbols used by groups like Boko Haram or ISWAP. To this end, establishing a joint content moderation task force comprising Nigerian security agencies, tech firms, and civil society groups could significantly enhance the speed and accuracy of content removal (Akinola, 2021). Platforms must also invest in training more Africa-based moderators and improving automated detection tools to address the local context effectively. As highlighted by Gorwa (2019), co-regulatory approaches where governments and companies share oversight can help balance national security with freedom of expression.
  - iii. **Address Root Causes (Job Creation, Education Access, and Counter-Narrative Programs):** While tackling online radicalization is critical, it cannot succeed without addressing the underlying socioeconomic conditions that make youth vulnerable to extremist ideologies. The lack of meaningful employment, poor access to quality education, and social alienation create fertile ground for radical recruiters who offer a sense of belonging, purpose, and economic relief. Government and development agencies must scale up investments in youth employment programs, vocational training, and entrepreneurship support in high-risk regions. According to Okolie et al. (2021), such interventions reduce susceptibility to radicalization by improving self-worth and future prospects. Equally important are counter-narrative programs - strategic communication campaigns designed to undermine extremist messaging. These should include testimonies from former militants, peace-focused Islamic teachings, and locally credible voices promoting tolerance and inclusion. As Ingram (2016) emphasizes, counter-narratives must be authentic, emotionally resonant, and culturally grounded to counteract the appeal of extremist propaganda.

## **Conclusion**

Social media has evolved beyond a space for casual interaction and information sharing - it has become a battleground where ideologies, identities, and influence are contested. In Northern Nigeria, this virtual arena is increasingly being exploited by terrorist groups like Boko Haram and ISWAP to radicalize vulnerable youth, spread propaganda, and recruit followers. What makes this threat especially dangerous is the silent, invisible power of algorithmic systems that reward sensationalism and extremism, creating echo chambers that reinforce violence rather than challenge it. The urgency to address digital radicalization cannot be overstated. Nigeria is facing a complex security challenge that blends poverty, exclusion, and religious manipulation with the powerful reach of social media. If left unchecked, this phenomenon threatens to deepen instability, prolong insurgency, and undermine long-term development goals in the region. Therefore, a proactive and coordinated response is essential. This includes digital literacy campaigns, robust collaboration with technology platforms, and comprehensive investments in youth empowerment and education. Government agencies, civil society, religious leaders, educators, and private tech companies must come together in a unified front

to dismantle the digital infrastructure that fuels extremism. National security can no longer be defended solely with guns and boots on the ground; it must now include firewalls, algorithms, and informed citizens who can resist radical narratives in both real and virtual spaces.

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